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Abstract
I study a game with one market incumbent and a small entrant in a duopoly
with perfectly substitutable products. Firms face a sequential Bertrand com-
petition. Limiting the initial capacity (Judo economics) is a plausible entry
strategy for the small firm. If we, however, introduce asymmetry in produc-
tion cost or product quality, capacity limitation can become obsolete. I derive
thresholds as regards the cost and quality differences for the entrant’s choice
to voluntarily limit the production capacity in equilibrium. I study a mar-
ket entry game with price competition and perfectly substitutable products.
Limiting the initial capacity (Judo economics) is a plausible entry strategy. I
show that under asymmetry in production cost or product quality, capacity
limitation can become obsolete.
Keywords: Sequential Bertrand Competition, Judo Economics,
Asymmetric Firms, Cost, Quality
JEL: D43, L11
1. Introduction
Judo economics as an entry strategy was first introduced in Gelman and
Salop (1983). They show that a market entrant can use a capacity limitation
to successfully survive in a Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods.
For the market incumbent, accommodating entry turns out to be the profit
maximizing response towards a Judo entrant. Rather than cutting down
prices for the whole market, the incumbent allows the new entrant to serve
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a small niche but sustains the power to serve the residual market as a mo-
nopolist.
Meanwhile, the idea of Judo economics has been further elaborated in the
economic literature. Empirical work has reported that Judo entrants are
more likely to survive competition and incumbents respond less aggressively
towards Judo entrants (Thomas, 1999). Also experimental results have shown
that Judo economics works in the original setting (Cracau and Sadrieh, 2013).
Theoretical work has focused on Judo Economics in more or less symmetric
settings (Sørgard, 1995; Allen et al., 2000; Dı´az et al., 2009). If any, only
a cost advantage for the incumbent is considered. However, it is arguable
that in some industries, entrants emerge with a technological innovation that
gives them a cost or a quality advantage. The purpose of this article is to
apply the idea of Judo Economics to a wider range of settings. I will allow
for asymmetries in the firms’ cost structure and the consumers’ willingness
to pay.
2. Model preliminaries
I initially study two firms i = 1, 2 in a sequential Bertrand competition
with firm 1 being the first moving entrant and firm 2 being the second moving
market incumbent.
Assumption 1. Products are perfect substitutes with different quality levels.
Consumers’ willingness to pay for firm i’s product is wi.
Assumption 2. Total market demand D is fixed.
In the first stage of the game, the entrant decides on his price p1 ≤ w1
and a capacity limitation 0 < k ≤ D. Then, the incumbent decides on her
price p2 ≤ w2, adjusting output accordingly.2 We, thus, assume that the
incumbent has no capacity limitation.
Assumption 3. Consumers’ preferences are lexicographic. Consumers buy
from the firm which offers the highest consumer net benefit βi = wi − pi. If
firms offer the same net benefit, consumers buy from the incumbent.
2W.l.o.g. I use male pronouns for the entrant and female pronouns for the incumbent.
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Under Assumptions 1 to 3 and efficient rationing, firms’ sales si depend
on the firms’ decisions as well as on the market parameter. If the incumbent
accommodates the entrant by setting a price p2 > p1 then s1 = k and s2 =
D − k. Otherwise, s1 = 0 and s2 = D.
Finally, we assume that firms’ have linear production cost Ci(si) = cisi with
0 ≤ ci < wi. Firms maximize their total profit πi = pisi − Ci = (pi − ci) si.
3. Asymmetry in marginal cost
When considering a cost differential, it is useful to define δ = c2 − c1 as
the cost differential between the two firms. A cost differential δ < 0 then
indicates a cost advantage for the incumbent whereas δ > 0 indicates a cost
advantage for the entrant. We can now differentiate two cases.
3.1. No cost advantage for the entrant (δ ≤ 0)
This case is similar to the original model of Gelman and Salop (1983). It
covers the symmetric case as well as the case where the incumbent is at a
cost advantage.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, the equilibrium price and capac-
ity choices in the symmetric game satisfy pJAsymC1 = (w + c1)/2, k
JAsymC =
(w − c1)D/(2(w − c2) and pJAsymC2 = w.
Proof. After observing the entrants’s price p¯1 and capacity k¯, the incum-
bent can give two price responses. She may either choose p2 = p¯1 and
match the entrants’s price. In this case, she serves the entire market as
the sole firm and earns a profit πMatch2 (p2) = (p¯1 − c2)D. Alternatively, she
can chooses a price p2 > p¯1 and accommodate the entrant. In this case,
the incumbent acts as a quasi-monopolist for the residual market and earns
πResid2 = (w − c2)
(
D − k¯).3 From that, it is clear that the entrant must
choose a price-capacity pair (p1, k) so that the condition π
Match
2 ≤ πResid2 is
fulfilled, i.e. the incumbent’s profit from accommodation must not be smaller
than her profit from deterring entry.
Let us now denote λ(k) as the function which assigns the greatest possi-
ble price p1 to each capacity k that fulfills the condition. The entrant
3The incumbent will always choose a price p2 = w if accommodating, because demand
is fixed and thus ∂πResid2 /∂p2 > 0.
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then maximizese π1(p1, k) = (p1 − c1)k w.r.t. p1 ≤ λ(k). For the equi-
librium, Gelman and Salop (1983) derive that the constraint holds with
equality. The condition for the optimal capacity k∗ can then be derived as
0 = λ(k∗) + k∗λ′(k∗)−C ′1(k∗). From that, also equilibrium prices p∗1 = λ(k∗)
and p∗2 = argmax π
Resid
2 (k
∗) are determined.
Equilibrium profits can be derived as πJAsymC1 = (w − c1)2D/4(w − c2)
and πJAsymC2 = (w + c1 − 2c2)D/2. Being the second mover comes along
with a strategic advantage and results in higher profits. Moreover, a cost
advantage strengthens the incumbent.
3.2. Cost advantage for the entrant (δ > 0)
This case was excluded by Gelman and Salop (1983) because it can make
the Judo limitation obsolete.
Proposition 2. If δ > w − c2, the entrant will not limit his capacity.
Proof. The entrant can limit his capacity and earn Judo profits πJAsymC1 . If
he does not limit his capacity, the incumbent will always match p1 as long as
p1 ≥ c2. Setting a price pForceC1 = c2− , the entrant can force the incumbent
to stay out of the market. In this case, any capacity limitation becomes
obsolete, i.e. the entrant sets kForceC = D. Using this strategy, the entrant
earns πForceC1 = (c2 −  − c1)D. The forcing strategy is beneficial for the
entrant if πForceC1 ≥ πJAsymC1 . After some calculations, this condition yields
lim→0 δ > w − c2. For parameter values such that this condition holds,
capacity limitation is no longer the profit maximizing entry strategy.
If the cost advantage of the entrant is sufficiently high, he can destroy the
strategic advantage of the incumbent by pricing below her marginal cost.
4. Asymmetry in product quality
We assume that product quality is perfectly represented by consumers’
WTP and therefore consider wi as the quality of firm i’s product. For the
further analysis, we denote ηi = wi−ci as the social benefit of firm i’s product.
We also define κ = η2 − η1 as the difference in social benefit between firms’
products. If κ > 0, the incumbent’s product provides a higher social benefit
and vice versa.
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4.1. No quality advantage for the entrant (κ > 0)
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, the equilibrium price and capac-
ity choices in the asymmetric demand game satisfy pJAsymW1 = (w1 + c1) /2,
kJAsymW = η1D/2η2 and p
JAsymW
2 = w2.
Proof. The proof follows a similar reasoning as that of Proposition 1. Know-
ing the entrant’s price p¯1 and capacity k¯, the incumbent may either match
the social benefit of the entrant’s product (p2 = w2 − w1 + p¯1) or accommo-
date (p2 > w2 − w1 + p¯1). In the first case, the incumbent serves the entire
market and earns a profit of πMatchW2 (p2) = (w2 − w1 + p¯1 − c2)D. In the
second case, the incumbent serves only the residual demand and therefore
maximizes her profit πResidW2 = (w2 − c2)
(
D − k¯). Because the entrant has
to ensure that entry is accommodated, he must choose a pair (p1, k) that
fulfills the condition that the incumbent’s profit from accommodation is not
smaller than her profit from entry deterrence, i.e. πMatchW2 ≤ πResidW2 . Let
θ(k) denote the function that maps the greatest p1 that fulfills the condi-
tion for each k. Then, the entrant maximizes π1(p1, k) = (p1 − c1)k w.r.t.
p1 ≤ θ(k). As Gelman and Salop (1983) derive that the constraint holds
with equality in equilibrium, one can derive the condition for the optimal
capacity k∗ as 0 = θ(k∗) + k∗θ′(k∗) − C ′(k∗). This determines equilibrium
prices p∗1 = θ(k
∗) and also p∗2 = argmax π
ResidW
2 (k
∗).
For the assumptions made, equilibrium profits are πJAsymW1 = η
2
1D/4η2
and πJAsymW2 = (2η2 − η1)D/2. We can see that each firm’s profit increases
in the social benefit of its own product whereas it decreases in the social
benefit of the other firm’s product.
4.2. Quality advantage for the entrant (κ < 0)
Proposition 4. If η1 > 2η2, the entrant will not limit his capacity.
Proof. The entrant can limit his capacity and earn Judo profits πJAsymW1 . If
he does not limit his capacity, the incumbent will always set a price p2 =
w2 −w1 + p1 to match the net benefit that the entrant’s product provides to
the consumers. Of course, the incumbent cannot set a price p2 < c2. Setting
a price pForceW1 = w1−w2+c2−, the entrant can force the incumbent to stay
out of the market. In this case, any capacity limitation becomes obsolete,
i.e. the entrant sets kForceW = D. Using this strategy, the entrant earns
πForceW1 = (w1 − w2 + c2 −  − c1)D. The forcing strategy is beneficial for
the entrant if πForceW1 ≥ πJAsymW1 . After some calculations, this condition
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yields lim→0 η1 > 2η2. For parameter values such that this condition holds,
capacity limitation is no longer the profit maximizing entry strategy.
If the social benefit of the entrant’s product is sufficiently high, he can
destroy the strategic advantage of the incumbent by pricing her out of the
market.
5. Concluding remarks
The results of this study are derived under the main assumptions of per-
fect substitutability and fixed market demand. The first assumption is crucial
for the existence of Judo-type market outcomes. With horizontal product dif-
ferentiation, a first mover earns positive profits in a sequential price compe-
tition even without capacity limitation, see for example Furth and Kovenock
(1993). In contrast, the assumption of fixed market demand is non-crucial.
Equilibrium characteristics remain the same with linear demand, however,
outcomes become analytically less tractable.4 Finally, as Gelman and Salop
(1983) show, the assumption of efficient rationing only alters the distribution
of equilibrium profits, but not the structure of equilibrium market outcomes.
The results for the asymmetric settings derived in this article provide a
basis for future work. I derive that the social benefit of a firm’s product has
a strong impact on firms’ profits. Therefore, it would be interesting to study
a situation comparable to that in Motta (1993), where product quality is not
exogenously given but firms determine their product quality by costly invest-
ments. Aligned with that, one could model market demand in dependence
of products’ quality. Boccard and Wauthy (2009), for example, show that
quality reduction and capacity limitation can be strategic substitutes. They
study a game where an entrant commits to a quality and a capacity before
a simultaneous price competition with the dominant market incumbent. By
assumption, the incumbent in their model always sets the maximum quality
level. The entrant can only choose to reduce quality. Obviously, both capac-
ity limitation and quality reduction relax price competition in this setting.
They show that in equilibrium, it is more advantageous for the entrant to
limit his capacity and imitate the quality of the incumbent than choosing
4For settings with asymmetric cost and linear demand, for example, equilibrium prices,
capacity and profits can only be derived numerically.
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a large capacity but reducing quality. Because my model also considers en-
trants offering potentially higher quality than the incumbent, the equilibrium
result with endogenous quality choice might differ from that of Boccard and
Wauthy (2009).
A further model extension might include fixed market entry cost. Entry
cost can create incentives for the entrant to turn his first mover position
into a strategic advantage by setting limit prices. Typically, limit prices are
assumed to be an entry-deterrence option of the incumbent (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1982) but in the setting with an advantaged entrant, this idea can
be reversed.
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